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GENERAL INTRODUCTION: 
AN OVERVIEW OF FOOD SAFETY PROBLEMS 
Americans have spent on average more than fifteen percent of their total expenditures 
on food at home and away from home yearly since 1986 (CES 1992). Are food supplies 
safe? Kramer (1990) listed eight major food safety incidents^ in the 1980s. These incidents 
involved a wide range of food items^ and have caused substantial economic losses such as 
illness or death to individuals and sale losses to food industries. How do consumers react to 
food safety accidents? Do they care about food safety problems? This general introduction 
first explains the dissertation format and then describes three economic issues in food safety 
problems: the costs incurred in the food safety incidents, consumers' attitudes to the risks in 
foods, and the importance of uncertainties involved in food safety problems. Finally, we 
discuss what economists can do for these problems. 
An Explanation of the Dissertation Organization 
Following the general introduction are three separate papers which relate to issues in 
food safety. The format in each paper is self-contained with its own introduction, model, 
summary conclusion, references, tables, and figures. Paper I constructs a basic model for the 
analysis of demand for two risky foods. Both of the cases of exogenous and endogenous 
safety levels are considered. Paper n applies the model in section I to derive the measure of 
the consumer's willingness to pay for the food safety improvement and the marginal 
willingness to pay for the risky food. Paper HI considers the issue of whether the perfectly 
competitive market would provide the socially optimal safety level and implications for the 
government's regulation of the food supply. Following Paper HI is a general conclusion. 
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References cited in the general introduction and conclusion sections are included in the 
literature cited section. 
The Costs of Food Safety Accidents 
Food safety accidents cause economic losses either for consumers or producers, or 
both. These costs may include medical costs, productivity loss, values associated with 
consumer deaths^ and sales losses for producers. For consumers, the "cost of illness" (COI) 
approach is the traditional way used to estimate the loss due to the foodborne diseases. COI 
measures the resources that the economy would save if the accident did not occur. Based on 
1987 values, for example, Roberts (1989) estimated the human ilhiess costs (including only 
medical costs and productivity losses) at $4.8 billion annually caused by all foodborne 
bacterial diseases. Recent estimates give the range of COI for U.S. microbial foodborne 
diseases is between $4 and $8 billion annually (Roberts and Marks 1993). Listeria, a 
microbial organism which might cause serious health problems, has been found in prepared 
sandwiches and fresh vegetables; and caused 400-500 deaths out of an average 1600 cases of 
infection reported each year (Kramer 1990)^. 
Producer losses in sales have been estimated in several studies. Smith et al. (1989), 
for example, studied the effects of the announcement of the pesticide heptachlor 
contamination of fresh fluid milk in Oahu of Hawaii in 1982. Although a considerable 
amount of suspicious milk was recalled or dumped, the continuous media reports were found 
to affect the demand for milk in Oahu. The total estimated sales loss of $422,000 amounted 
to over $26,000 per producer in Oahu. Another example concerns the estimated sales losses 
from the publicity concerning Alar use on apples, which amounted to $194.8 million (in 1983 
dollars) during the July 1984 to July 1989 periods (van Ravenswaay and Hoehn 1991). In 
addition to the sales losses such as these due to the announcement of risky contamination in 
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foods, food producers may also suffer losses of sales or market share from the competition of 
other food producers in producing differentiation foods (Caswell and Johnson 1991). 
These examples provide some idea of what types of costs may occur to consumers 
and producers, and how serious the accidents may be. The range of estimates indicates the 
inherent difficulty in estimation of consumers' illness costs and that consumer's perceived risk 
is likely to have an important effect on changes in the demand for risky foods. 
Consumers' Attitudes Toward the Food Safety Problems 
Faced with possible losses from consuming risky foods, what is the consumer 
response to the potential food safety hazard^? The following lists some of observations 
based on recent surveys. A survey by the Food Marketing Institute (FMI) in 1991 showed 
that an average of more than 75% of respondents considered residues (such as pesticides and 
herbicides) as a serious hazard during the period of 1985 to 1991; this number reached 80% 
in 1991 (FMI 1991). Other surveys also have reported similar results (van Ravenswaay 
1988). When people have been asked "how confident are they about the safety of foods in 
the supermarket" in the January 1989 FMI's annual survey, 81% of respondents felt strongly 
confident (Senauer et al. 1991). This figure had dropped to 67% in a follow-up FMI's survey 
after the Alar issue and the grape tampering episode in the early of 1989, However, this 
confidence figure recovered to 79% and 82% in the January 1990 and 1991 FMI's surveys, 
respectively. 
Consumers appear to be concerned about food safety issues but the structure of their 
concern is changing. The continuous surveys by FMI indicate consumers' increased concerns 
about nutritional issues instead of foodborne diseases through an open-ended question. This 
result may imply the consumers are more educated about nutritional issues or consumers are 
changing their concerns about food safety issues through time (van Ravenswaay 1988). 
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An important feature of food safety is that the ranking of food safety issues by 
consumers is different from the ranking of scientific experts. In rating the consumers' 
concerns about food safety issues, pesticide residues and environmental contaminants appear 
to be of greatest concern in many surveys (Jones 1992). These surveys also indicate that 
disease or bacterial contamination are the next greatest concern, followed by preservatives 
and artificial colors, irradiation and artificial sweeteners. However, this ranking is opposite to 
that of scientifîc experts. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has considered diseases 
caused by microorganisms as the most serious foodbome health risk for many years. 
Incidences of reported foodborne diseases due to bacterial diseases surpass those caused by 
chemical, parasitic and viral diseases (Kramer 1990). In fact, the FDA also considers 
malnutrition and nutritional imbalance as the second most serious food safety problem. 
In sum, most consumers show great concern about food safety issues but they appear 
confident in the safety of food supplies. Second, consumers' concerns have switched from 
ranking foodbome diseases to nutritional issues in the last five years. Finally, the ranking of 
consumers' concern about the types of risk runs counter to experts' concern. These 
observations about consumers' attitudes and the information about the risk in foods point out 
inherent uncertainty in the risky effects of foods and asymmetric information about food 
safety. 
Risks and the Problems of Uncertainty 
In considering food safety, risky food is one that contains hazardous ingredients such 
as excessive pesticides, or microbial contamination; and the consumption of the risky food 
may cause some degree of loss. In this section, a summary about the definition of risk, the 
types of risk, and the risky effects is given first. Then the potential uncertainties surrounding 
the risk and the risky effects are identified. 
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The meaning of risk is often confused between scientists and consumers (Kendall 
1990). In science, risk is usually defined as "the probability of loss or injury." More 
precisely, risk is the probability that an adverse effect of some kind of loss will occur 
(Wilkinson 1990). However, in forming perceptions about risk, consumers are affected both 
by the announcement of "the probability of loss" from experts as well as other factors such as 
mass reports of media on particular food accidents. 
The types of food safety risk can be grouped as the following: (1) chemical or 
pesticides in agricultural products, (2) pathogenic microorganisms, and (3) naturally 
occurring toxins, such as aflatoxin which is exhibited by a mold contained in corn or peanuts 
(Kramer 1990). Sometimes, the concerns of nutritional health, the effects of cigarette 
smoking and alcohol drinking are also considered as food safety issues (Jones 1992). 
The hazardous or toxic effects in consuming risky foods are generally divided into 
two categories: acute and chronic effects (Wilkinson 1990). Acute effects usually occur 
within a short period of time (say 24 - 48 hours) after exposure, for example, from exposure 
to E-coli in meats or fruits. Acute effects are considered to be more easily evaluated than 
chronic effects which are often cumulative in nature. The chronic effect may be delayed for 
years after exposure, for instance, illness caused by long-term exposure to carcinogenic 
agents applied as pesticides to foods. 
All sorts of uncertainties arise in food safety problems: uncertainties about 
identification and characterization of food safety hazards, the effect of hazards on the public 
health, and interaction of various types of hazards in the human body. Scientific experts 
sometimes have different opinions on the identification of risky effects. For example, 
contradictory evidence about the effect of livestock hormones residues on humans has 
confused consumers about the safety of the meat products and has been used by the 
European Community (EC) as a rationale to protect meat consumers (and, of course. 
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producers at the same time) in the EC countries (Krissoff 1989). The scientific controversy 
about mixed evidence also tends to decrease consumers' confidence in the experts' opinions, 
making consumers even more likely to be misled by media reports. 
Uncertainty which arises fi-om how foods are processed is another important issue. In 
the case of pesticide residues, the potential risk to human health is a function of the toxicity 
of the pesticide residues in foods and the level of exposure. Some risks can be avoided by 
consumers in selecting foods grown without pesticide application or by washing and/or 
peeling food in home preparation. However, consumers have less control over the quality of 
commercially processed foods. Without further searching or obtaining information about the 
process used in producing food (or source of agricultural product ingredients), consumers are 
uncertain to what levels of the risk they are being exposed. Another uncertainty is about to 
what degree exposure to residues may adversely affect health, which is likely to depend on 
many individual characteristics. 
What Can Economists Do? 
The fact that consumers often distort the scientific risks in foods, and under or over 
estimate dietary hazards indicates the need for better understanding of what factors affect 
consumers' risk perception. Given the importance of encouraging the private sector to 
improve food safety levels (Kramer 1990), it is of prime importance to provide information 
which can guide resource allocation to achieve aggregate safety improvements. Information 
on consumers' willingness to pay (WTP) will be important to food industries in making 
decisions about production technologies. Explaining consumer perception of risk related to 
food safety issues and obtaining a reasonable estimate of consumers' valuation of food safety 
are two important tasks for economists. In this section, the first issue considered is 
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consumers' risk perception. Then a review of estimates of individuals' WTP for food safety is 
presented. 
Explaining thg Consumers' Risk PerçgptiQn 
Changes in consumers' perception of risk and reaction to the controversies about the 
health risk of certain hazardous contaminants in foods can cause significant sales losses 
(Swartz and Strand 1981; Smith et al. 1988; van Ravenswaay and Hoehn 1991). The study of 
what factors affect consumers' risk perception, and by what process, has become an 
important issue for food producers and the government. 
The psychometric paradigm, one of the traditional ways of research on consumer 
perception of risk about consuming goods or activities, focuses on the explanation of how the 
consumer's perceptions vary given the different characteristics of each type of risk (van 
Ravenswaay 1991). Slovic (1986) gave a list of factors^ that affect the individual's perceived 
risk. For example, the individual may consider the "not memorable" event being "less risky" 
and the "memorable" event being "more risky." Analogous to Slovic's observations, people 
are more concerned about the effect of pesticide residues than bacterial-causing disease 
because the former is frequendy covered by the media (memorably) by the consumers. 
Another example is that individuals increase their concern about nutritional aspects of foods 
while having less concerns about diseases caused by bacteria in foods because the former is 
considered being more "controllable"^ by consumers than the latter. 
For economists in regard to the consumers' risk perception, the task is to provide a 
better understanding of what factors determine the consumers' acquisition of information and 
what are efficient ways of providing information to narrow the gap in the differing risk 
assessments of food experts, food industries, and consumers, Putier and Frazao (1991), for 
example, looked at how the consumption level of total fat intakes in foods varied with 
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women's characteristics and awareness of health information. Their study tried to explain 
what are the factors in determining the demand for risky food (determined relative to fat 
intake). Further research on investigating the determinants of efficiently providing 
information is needed. 
The Estimation of the Consumer's WTP 
One of the important tasks that economists can do for food safety problems is to 
provide guidance for determining consumers' value (willingness to pay) for safety when 
markets do not work properly in providing the information about safety value. There are 
several methods by which to estimate the individual's WTP for the reduction of risk in foods: 
(1) the contingent valuation method (CVM), (2) the laboratory simulation, or experimental 
methods, and (3) the hedonic pricing method (observed market behavior) and the input 
resource method (nonmarket behavior) which examines individuals' willingness to spend 
more time (i.e., time resources) in providing safer food at home. 
The common method by which to evaluate WTP is to use a contingent valuation 
method by surveying consumers directly. The advantages of CVM are the ability to examine 
a considerable subset of the population and the opportunity to compare the consumer's 
preferences for different processing technologies (Roberts and Marks, 1993). For instance, 
Misra, et al. (1991) used CVM to measure individuals' WTP for the differentials between 
pesticide free (organic food) and pesticide treated produce in the Georgia area, and 
concluded that the individual's risk attitude was an important factor in determining the 
magnitude of WTP for organic food. 
The major disadvantage of CVM is that the respondents are considered to answer any 
question in a "hypothetical" situation (what they think) rather than in a real situation (what 
they actually do). The laboratory simulation method is one method which tries to overcome 
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this disadvantage. Based on a laboratory experiment, for example, Shin (1991) used 
nonhypothetical experimental methods to evaluate participant response, when informed about 
the probabilities of getting a microbial foodborne disease in a meal, to estimate the 
individual's WTP for a safer meal. There were several limitations to his study, however, and 
care needs to be taken in designing what is the "realistic" situation in this method. The small 
sample problem and nonrepresentative sample problem are likely to be shortcomings of this 
method. 
Another way of measuring WTP is the hedonic pricing method. This method looks at 
the existing market for goods to evaluate the price difference for a particular product when 
the safety level (or perceived risk) changes. The study of van Ravenswaay and Hoehn (1991) 
is one application of this method to food safety. They analyzed welfare implications due to 
the announcement of Alar exposure in apples during the period 1984-89; and measured 
consumers' WTP for Alar free apples, by estimating a value, (or price), ascribed to the value 
of apples with and without Alar risk. The hedonic method is restricted in two ways: first, the 
equilibrium price change may be caused both by changes in safety (risk perception) as well as 
other factors, such as changes in income and prices of substitutes; second, it is difficult to 
derive the social aggregate WTP from this method. 
The relation among alternative valuation methods (COI, self-protective expenditures, 
and WTP) has been a focus of study in evaluating specific health risk (Berger et al. 1987; 
Shogren and Crocker 1991; Quiggin 1992). COI and self-protective expenditures are often 
considered as the lower bound of WTP in estimating the individual's valuation of health risk 
change (Berger et al. 1987). For valuing demand for food safety, self-protective behavior in 
food safety, such as time resources used in searching for a safer food or carefully preparing 
foods, could be used to value the WTP for improvement of food safety. However, lack of 
10 
data in this area leaves the study of using this technique in estimating WTP still in its 
beginning. 
This review has summarized methodologies used and selected empirical studies for 
estimating WTP for safer food. Continuing research on the estimation of WTP for food 
safety will be useful for food industries and policy makers. As indicated by Kramer (1988), 
economists can make an important contribution to public policy related to the food safety 
problem by providing a better understanding of consumers' valuation of food safety or safety 
information. 
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NOTES 
^ These accidents are: (1) Alar contamination in apples, (2) Chilean grape poisoning, 
(3) seafood safety, (4) poultry, livestock products and salmonella, (5) Listeria in dairy 
products and vegetables, (6) hormone use in livestock, (7) aflatoxin in peanuts and com, and 
(8) saturated fat in "Tropical" oils. 
2 These foods included apples, grapes, com, peanuts, vegetables, poultry, livestock 
products, dairy products, seafood, sandwiches, and palm kernel oils, etc. 
3 A reasonable estimation of consumers' losses should also try to cover the following: 
leisure time losses, pain and suffering, child care costs, risk aversion costs, travel costs, 
averting behavior costs, home modifications, and vocational and physical rehabilitation costs 
(Roberts 1989). However, some of these costs are difficult to estimate in practice. 
 ^ A summary of the death rates and estimated COI of various foodborne bacterial 
diseases could be found in Roberts and Foegeding (1991), page 121. 
5 Jones (1992) considers food safety issues to include foods which involve the 
following: additives, colors, and flavors; antibiotics and other food additive; fertilizers and 
other growing aids; irradiation; microbiological contamination; naturally occurring food 
toxicant; nutrition; pesticides; pollutants; processing, package and labeling; or tampering. 
However, some researchers do not consider the nutritional issues as food safety problems. 
6 These factors are: 
Less Risky More Riskv 
Voluntary 
Familiar 
Controllable 
Controlled by Self 
Fair 
Not memorable 
Not dread 
Chronic 
Diffuse in time and space 
Involuntary 
Unfamiliar 
Uncontrollable 
Controlled by others 
Unfair 
Memorable 
Dread 
Acute 
Focused in time and space 
Not fatal 
Immediate 
Natural 
Individual mitigation possible 
Fatal 
Delayed 
Artificial 
Individual mitigation impossible 
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Detectable 
Old risk 
Known to science 
Easily reduced 
Individual 
Does not affect me 
Not in my back yard 
Undetectable 
New risk 
Unknown to science 
Not easily reduced 
Catastrophic 
Affects me 
In my back yard 
' Slovic considered the "controllable" behavior being "more risky" and the 
"uncontrollable" behavior being "less risky." 
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PAPER I. 
SAFETY AND DEMAND FOR RISKY FOODS 
14 
INTRODUCTION 
Food safety issues have become a major concern for consumers in recent years. 
Concern about chemical contaminants in foods that present a potential hazard for human 
health led to the creation of a food contamination monitoring program in 1976, which was 
sponsored by the United Nations, World Health Organization (WHO), and the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO). A US. survey by Food Marketing Institute showed that an 
average above 75 percent of respondents considered pesticide residues in food as a serious 
hazard between 1984 and 1989 (Senauer et al. 1991). Economic theory predicts that the 
perception of the risky content in food by consumers will have an adverse effect on the 
demand for the food. Recent examples include the decrease in the consumption of fresh 
apples in response to the announcement of Alar residues in apples (van Ravenswaay and 
Hoehn 1991), and the European Community's ban of beef imports on the basis of hormone 
use in production. 
There has been little theoretical work on the theory of demand for foods in the 
presence of risk. Two studies which incorporate the aspects of risk in consumption are 
Ippolito (1981), and Choi and Jensen (1991). They focused on demand for one risky good. 
However, consumers have imperfect information about product characteristics. Continued 
scientific research may reveal hitherto unknown hazards of a consumption good that was 
considered safe in the past. Thus, it is more realistic to suppose that most consumption 
goods (more than one) are risky. For instance, it is difficult to find a food without hazards. 
High intake of saturated fat and relatively high cumulative cholesterol levels from red meat 
have been linked to heart disease. A switch in diet from red meat to more vegetables may 
considerably reduce levels of cholesterol in the body, but pesticide residues have been found 
on vegetables. Thus, it is important to understand how a consumer chooses among risky 
consumption goods. 
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This paper analyzes the demand for two risky foods. While the theory can be 
extended to n risky foods, the basic framework is developed for two risky foods. The 
consumer derives some utility directly from the consumption of the risky foods. However, 
unlike pure consumption goods in conventional demand theory, a risky food has a side effect; 
a risky food contains an ingredient which reduces the probability of survival of the 
consumer ^  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 investigates demand for two risky foods 
over two periods when the hazard contents of the risky foods are fixed. Section 3 considers 
demands for safety and quantities when safety levels are chosen by the consumer. Section 4 
contains concluding remarks. 
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DEMAND FOR RISKY FOODS WHEN HAZARD LEVELS ARE FIXED 
In conventional demand theory consumption goods are assumed to increase utility 
without side effects and will be called pure foods here. Foods with negative side effects will 
be called impure or "risky" foods^. To analyze demand for risky foods which contain 
hazardous ingredients, it is important to specify whether consumers are capable of choosing 
the level of hazards embodied in the product. In this section, we investigate demand for 
foods whose hazards levels can not be changed by the consumer. 
A risky food contains a potentially hazardous ingredient such as a toxin, pathogen, or 
carcinogen. Assume that the hazard cannot economically be separated by the consumer. 
When a commodity bundle contains an impure consumption good, the consumer has to weigh 
the direct utility gains versus potential health risks. Consequently, a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function is used to derive demand functions for risky foods. 
For simplicity, assume that the consumer spends income on two risky foods each 
period. Consumer preferences in each period can be represented by a monotone increasing 
and concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 
u, =u(X„,X2,), 
where Xj^ is the quantity of the risky food Xj in period t, i = 1,2. Total utility of the 
consumer is 
(1) 
where T is the terminal period, and Ô is a discount factor, 0 < S < 1. 
Equation (1) yields total utility when the survival into the terminal period T is certain. 
When the probability of survival into the second period is uncertain, however, the utility in 
each period must be further weighed by the probability of survival. Obviously, in a 
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multiperiod model with T > 2, the probability of survival continually declines until the 
terminal period is reached. 
To get insights on the demand for risky foods when survival is uncertain in the least 
complicated way, we use a two period model (T = 2). Consider a representative individual 
who lives for two periods with time-invariant utility functions over the two risky foods, Xj 
and X2. We assume that the hazard content of these foods cannot be detected by visual 
inspection and that the harmful effects of the risky foods are realized after a time lag, as in the 
case of many carcinogens. Thus, the hazards do not affect consumer's utility in the current 
period, but affect the consumer's chance of survival in good "health" into the next period. 
Thus, the consumer faces uncertainty regarding survival into the next period. 
Assume that the probability of survival is less than one and known by the consumer. 
Let n be the probability of survival into the second period, 0 ^  tc < 1. The budget constraint 
in each period is given by 
PuXi.+pA =1., t = l,2. 
where Pj, and are the price of the risky good X{ and income in period t, respectively. If the 
consumer survives, he maximizes u(Xi2 .Xjj ) subject to the budget constraint in the second 
period. Let X,[pi2,p22.l2] X2[p,2,p22>l2] denote the second period demand functions. 
The indirect utility in the second period is then 
~ (Pl2»P22 )^2)»^2(Pl2 'P22 *^2)]' 
It should be noted that the individual receives no income if he does not survive. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that the utility level in the second period is zero if the 
consumer fails to survive (U2 = 0). Assume further that the utility function in each period is 
normalized so that the utility in the second period when the consumer survives is unity, i.e., 
U2 = v = 1. Then the second period utility can be written as a random variable. 
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f 0, with probability (1 - %), 
u, = < 
[ 1, with probability 
The expected utility of the consumer is 
J = u(X„X2)+S7I (2) 
where the subscript t = 1 is suppressed (i.e., X, = X„ and X; = X^, ). 
Let Œj denote the amount of impurity per unit of the risky foods Xj consumed. For 
simplicity, the hazard content in each food is assumed to be constant and is normalized so 
that ^1.3 Then the amounts of impurity absorbed, Q, are defined as 
C,=a,X,=(l-p,)X„ i = l,2. (3) 
where P; = 1 - a, is a measure of the safety level of Xj; an increase in Pj indicates increased 
safety of Xj. 
The probability of survival is written as 
7t = 7C(C,,C2). (4) 
Assume that the probability of survival is decreasing in Cj, i.e., TCj < 0, where JC; = 
i = 1,2. Assume further that the probability of survival function is constantly equal to one 
when there is no impurity, i.e., 7c(0,0) = 1. 
The consumer's problem is to maximize the expected utility, J = u(X, 1X2)+ôtc 
subject to the budget constraint, I = p,X, +P2X2. The Lagrangian function associated with 
this problem can be written as 
L = u(X,X2 ) + gjt + X(I - p.X; - P2X2 ) (5) 
The first order conditions are 
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= u, + 8a,7c, - Xpi = 0, (6a) 
OA, 
= U; + Sa^TCz - A.P2 = 0, (6b) 
dXj 
•|^ = I-PiXi-P2X2 =0, (6c) 
where U; The solutions to (6a), (6b), and (6c) yield the following demand functions: 
oXj 
^1 ~ ^ l[Pl»P2>^»Pl»P2'^]» ^2 ~ ^2[Pl»P2'^»Pl»P2'^]* (7) 
Equations in (7) imply that demand functions are conditioned on safety levels or hazards, as 
well as by prices and income. 
Information and Demand for Risky Foods 
We first consider the role of safety information on the demand for risk foods. 
Equations (6a) and (6b) yield the equilibrium condition, 
f = (8) 
J2 P2 
where J, 5 [u; (X[,X; ) +ôai7[j (a,X|,a^X; )] is the expected marginal utility of Xj. 
Recall that the hazards in risky goods cannot be detected by visual inspection. If the 
consumer ignores the hazards in the consumption goods, he would behave as does the 
consumer in conventional demand theory. But, how does the consumer who is informed 
about the hazard behave relative to the uninformed consumer? If the hazards contained in X^ 
and X2 are ignored, then the resulting equilibrium may not be optimal, depending on the 
magnitude of and a^TC^. 
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To illustrate the impacts of ignorance of risk on the choice between risky foods, 
consider the case in Figure 1. In Figure 1, the optimal consumption occurs at point E, where 
the indifference curve J is tangent to the budget line, AB. If the consumer ignores the hazard 
inXj, then (the slope of U in Figure 1) is equated to at a point F, which causes 
h Pz 
over-consumption of Xj, i.e. X* < X°.4 This implies that the consumer buys less of the risky 
food, X ], when he correctly knows the hazard in the risky food than when the hazard is 
ignored. In other words, when the hazard in X2 is ignored, the individual consumes too 
much X2. 
PROPOSITION 1 : Assume that one good is safe and the other is risky. Then lack of 
information about hazards in the risky good (i.e. the individual mistakenly assumes the risky 
food is safe) results in over-consumption of the risky good. 
How does the consumer behave when the hazards in both foods are ignored? The 
consumer equates — (instead of —) to the price ratio when the hazards in both goods are 
"2 J2 
ignored. Note that the indifference curve — is steeper (flatter) than the indifference curve 
— if --—>(<) 0, which holds if and only if 3iZEl < (>)£l jf ^ Xj can be 
U2 J 2 u^ ^2^2 u^ ^2^2 ^2 
viewed as safer than X2. In this case, ignorance of hazards in both goods results in under­
consumption of Xi. On the other hand, if > —, then Xi is riskier than Xo, and lack of 
a27C2 "2 
information results in over-consumption of Xj. 
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The Effect of a Change in Income 
First, consider the effect of a change in income on demand. Differentiating (6a) -(6c) 
with respect to I gives 
^^1 _ (Pz^iz Pl^22 ) 
81 H 
^^2 _ (Pl^ZI "P2^ll ) 
ai ~ H 
dX _ (jf; -J11J22) 
ai H 
(9a) 
(9b) 
(9c) 
where 
Jii = a'j = Uij+8aiaj7Uij, 
and H is the determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix 
Jii J.2 
-Pi 
[H] = h ^22 -P2 
-Pi -P2 0 
By the second order conditions, the bordered Hessian, H = -p^Jjz "P^^ii +2p,p2J,2, is 
3X positive. From (9a) and (9b), the sign of -i- is generally indeterminate. The risky good Xj 
ol 
can 
3X be said to be normal if > 0. 
dl 
Change in the Price of a Risky Food 
As in the conventional case with riskless foods, the effect of a price change can be 
decomposed into the substitution and income effects. Differentiating the first order 
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conditions (6a) - (6c) with respect to p, yields 
3x, ..-pjx 
ap, H ''•lirl' 
(,0b, 
Although the expressions of the total effects in (10a) and (10b) are the same as those in the 
conventional case in the absence of risk, their values will be affected - although the direction 
is unclear - by the probability of survival, the discount rate and amount of hazards, a, and 
a,, all of which are embedded in H. As in the conventional case, the first term —£2^ in 
^ H 
(10a) can be viewed as the substitution effect, whereas the second term, 
income effect from a price change. 
In general, the sign of or cannot be determined. Note that the substitution 
dPi dpi 
2J, 
effect in (10a) is negative. If Xj is a normal good, then an increase in the price of Xj 
H 
will reduce the demand for Xj. If X2 is a normal good, then an increase of the price of Xj 
will have an ambiguous effect on the sign of X2 and the sign of ——^ will depend on the 
dpi 
magnitude of two positive terms, and 
Hazard Aversion and Change in Risk 
To investigate the effects of a change in hazard content, it is useful to introduce the 
notion of hazard aversion. The Arrow-Pratt measures of absolute risk aversion 
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A(I) = - " and relative risk aversion R(I) = have been widely used, where u(I) 
u (I) u'(I) 
is the utility of income function. To investigate consumption decisions on risky goods, we 
similarly define absolute hazard aversion in hazard 
Ai(C„C2) = -^>0, 
TCj 
and relative hazard aversion in hazard Q, 
Ri(C„C2) = -^>0. 
TCj 
Observe that Ttj; < 0 implies that the probability of survival decreases at an increasing rate. 
Further, TCjj < 0 also implies that the individual who reveals hazard aversion considers that the 
initial level of toxin may not have a serious effect on survival. When the level of toxin 
continues to accumulate and exceeds some certain amount or level, the probability of survival 
drops rapidly. 
An example of constant hazard aversion can be considered as follows. Consider the 
probability of survival function as 
TïCCpCj) -
0, otherwise 
where e is the exponential function; C; is the maximum amount of hazard content for Cj; and 
Y is a positive parameter. Note that e^' + e^' - 2 > 0 for positive values of y and C,, i = 
1,2. This survival function satisfies the following conditions: 
7r(C, =0,C2 =0) = 1, 
7r(C( = Cj, Cg = C2 ) = 0, 
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^ - -76^' ,0 
aCj e^'+e^:-2 ' 
a^TC -Y^e^' 
0. 
ac,acj 
for i, j = 1,2 and i j. In this case, the absolute hazard aversion Aj (C,, Cj ) = — = y is 
TCj 
constant. Therefore, y can be considered as the constant absolute hazard aversion (CAHA) 
coefficient. 
We now consider the effect of a change in hazard content on the demand for the risky 
foods. Differentiating (6a) - (6c) with respect to P, gives 
ax, -p28[p2(7c,+a,jc„x,)-p,a2x,7c2,] 
Û ' 
aX; _ Pi8[p2(7Ci+ai7CiiXi)-pia;Xi7C3i] 
ap, H 
Generally, an increase in the safety level of one food will have an ambiguous effect on the 
3X demand for its own or the other food, i.e., —^ may be positive or negative, i, j = 1,2. 
aPj 
First, consider the case of risk independence (jc^i =0). Intuitively, tTji = 0 implies 
that the marginal toxicity of C2 (^-, which is negative) is independent of an increase of the 
3X 
other toxin Cj. Hazard aversion (tCj, < 0) then implies -r;;^ > 0, and that an improvement of 
dp, 
the safety level of food i increases the demand for food i and decreases the demand for the 
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other food. Further, when Ttj, = 0, (1 la) and (lib) can be written as 
d X j  _-p287ti(l4-CiAi) 
aPi H 
(lia') 
_PiP257II(1+CIAI) (lib') 
aPi H 
where Aj is the measure of absolute hazard aversion in Cj. Note that if the consumer 
exhibits CAHA, A^ can be replaced a CAHA coefficient y. Although we can not determine 
the sign impact of v on and ^2^, we show that the CAHA coefficient y plays an 
ap, ap, 
important role in determining the results of these comparative statics. 
If 7C21 >0, the marginal toxicity of C2 is lessened (i.e., is increased and is less 
negative) as the other toxin Cj increases. Then the two types of hazards tend to offset the 
negative impacts of each other on the survival probability. In this case, an increase in the 
level of safety P, will increase the demand for Xj and decrease the demand for X2. If 
7I21 <0, the marginal toxicity of C2 is enhanced as the other hazard is added. In this case, the 
effects of an increase in the safety level P, on demands for risky foods are ambiguous. 
Discount Rate 
Recall that the individual can only live for two periods at most. How does change in 
the subjective discount rate, S, affect the demand for risky foods? Differentiating the first 
order conditions (6a) - (6c) with respect to S and rearranging terms, we have 
(12a) 
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/ 
ax, _ -''P: 
0C|7C| OCgTCg 
Pi P2 
as H (12b) 
ax, axj Recall that JC, < 0 for i = 1,2. Generally, the signs of -z:^ or are ambiguous and 
as do 
depend on the magnitude of and .5bZEL_ if Xj is relatively less hazardous 
Pi Pz 
>0), then an increase of the discount rate Ô increases the demand for Xi and 
Pi P2 
decreases the demand for X2. Intuitively, an increase in S means that as the importance of 
the future increases, the consumer increases the consumption of the less risky good X;. 
Further, this result could imply that age distribution of the population would be important to 
the demand for risky foods. Suppose an elder person gives more weight to the future than a 
younger one does, then the former would be more cautious about the choice of foods. If this 
is the case, then a society with a high percentage of old population would be more concerned 
about the consumption of risky foods. 
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DEMAND FOR FOOD SAFETY 
In recent years consumers have become increasingly more aware of various food 
hazards. In response to these changes, manufacturers have begun to market goods with 
different levels of hazard. For instance, some manufacturers differentiate low salt products 
from their regular products or "green" products grown under "natural" process from the 
products grown with pesticides or herbicides. In the food processing sector, manufacturers 
have also marketed cholesterol-free products to attract cholesterol conscious consumers. 
We now relax the assumption that good safety is exogenously given. The consumer 
is assumed to choose both the quantity and the safety level of each food he or she purchases. 
Let Pi (Pi ) be the price of Xj with impurity level tti = 1 - Pi. In general, a reduction of the 
impurity in the food raises the production cost. Thus, p; (Pi ) is assumed to increase as Pi 
increases. For simplicity, we assume a linear price schedule, Pi(Pi) = p° +qiPi, where q, is 
the price of safety for food i. 
The individual's problem is to maximize the expected utility, 
J = u(X„ X2 ) 454(1 - P, )X„ (1 - P2 )X3 ], 
subject to the budget constraint, 
I = (p? +qiPi)x, +(P2 +q2P2)X2-
The Lagrangian function for this problem can be expressed as 
j=u(x„x,)-(«ïï[(i-p,)x„(i-|3jx,]+4i-(pr+qiP.)x,-(p;+q,P3)x,]. 
The first order conditions are: 
T^ = Ui+SrCia,-X,(p°+q,Pi) = 0 (13a) 
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— = Uj + - A,(p^ + qaPz ) = 0 
•^ = -X,(S;i,+Xqi) = 0 
dPi 
•^ =-X2(ôJt2+^2) = 0 
0P2 
= I-(p° +q,P,)x, -(p° +qA)^2 = 0. (13e) 
(13d) 
(13c) 
(13b) 
The solution to (13a) - (13e) yields demands for Xj, X2, Pi,P2 • 
Xi =X,(p;',p°,q,,q2,I,8), Xj =X2(p,%P2,q,,q2,I,S) 
Pi =Pi(p^PLqnq2J,8), p2=P2(p^pLq„q2,I,5). 
dJ Observe that X, = — by the envelope theorem. Intuitively, A, is the expected marginal utility 
dl 
of income. If P, = pj = 1 (i.e., perfect safety), then we have = -XjXq, < 0, and 
(marginal utility of income) is positive if an interior solutions exists. 
PROPOSITION 2: If the consumer chooses the level of safety, then perfect safety is not 
optimal. 
Two Stage Maximization 
Assume the interior solutions exist. The first order conditions (13a) to (13d) can be 
stated as 
ap. 
XgXq; < 0 from (13c) and (13d) since 71,(0,0) = 7:2(0,0) = 0 by assumption and X 
29 
u, =-Ô7Cia,+X(p;+q,p,), (13a') 
Uj =-S7t2a2+X(p°+q2P2), (13b') 
Sït, =-A,q,, (13c') 
0712=-^^2- (13d') 
Substituting (13c') into (13a') and (13d') into (13b'), respectively, we obtain 
"i =4p°+qi), (13a") 
U2=^(p2+q2). (13b") 
Denote X* to be the optimal consumption of food i, fori = 1,2. Equations (13a") and 
(13b") give the following condition 
u.(x:.x;) (pr+q,)_p; 
Equation (14) suggests that MRS (i.e. —) between two risky foods is equal to their 
"2 
price ratio when both goods are perfectly safe. That is, in equilibrium, MRS between the two 
risky foods is independent of the level of food safety or riskiness, and is equated to the price 
of the risky good when risk is totally eradicated. Furthermore, from (13c) and (13d), we 
have 
iEL = SL (15) 
^2 Q2 
Note that 7t, measures the marginal rate of change in the probability of survival resulting 
from a change in impurity Cj. Equation (15) implies that the marginal rate of hazard 
substitution (MRHS), —, must be equal to the safety price ratio, —. Equations (14) and 
^2 ^2 
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(15) imply that demands for quantity and safety can be determined in two stages. In the first 
stage, the joint consumption path (Xi,X2) is completely determined by ordinal preferences. 
In the second stage, the levels of quantity (X%,X2) and safety (Pi.Pj) determined based 
on the riskiness. 
In order to get more insight about the two stage maximization process, we may image 
that the consumer decompose his choice problem into two stages. In the first stage the 
consumer decides the quantities of the consumption bundle of (Xj^ X2) and an amount of 
money B that will be used to allocate the safety levels of P, and P2 i" the second stage. In 
the second stage the consumer chooses the safety levels by given the budget B and the 
quantities of the foods to maximize the utility function. 
In the second stage, the budget allocated for the choice of safety is given and the 
budget constraint B for the safety levels is 
B = qiPiX,+q2PX2, 
where the quantities of Xj and X2 are the solutions from the first stage and hence they are 
fixed in the second stage. The Lagrangian function of the second stage can be written as 
jEu(X„X:)-,g,[(l-|),)X„(l-k)X:]+n[B-qAX,-q:PXj. 
The first order conditions for this problem are 
Sjc, =-|iq,, (16a) 
87C2 =-^iq2, (16b) 
B-q,P,X, -qzPzX; =0. (16c) 
Evaluating (16a) and (16b), we have — = — which is the condition of (15). That is, in the 
second stage, the consumer chooses P, and P^ by equating the marginal rate of hazard 
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substitution to the safety price ratio by given the solutions of Xj and X2 from the first stage 
maximization. 
The first order conditions of (16a)-(16c) can be solved to derive the demand functions 
for the safety P, and P;: 
p;(B,X„XJ, p;(B,X„Xz), 
where the pure quantity prices p° and the pure safety price q, are omitted from the demand 
functions. 
In the first stage, the consumer allocates the income I to purchase the consumption 
goods Xj and X2; and to the budget B which will be used in the second stage. The budget 
constraint for the first stage is 
I = p%+p%+B. 
The Lagrangian function can be written 
jsu(x„Xj)+8jr[(i-P;)x,.(i-p;)x,]+A.[I-p,"x, -p;Xj -B]. 
The first order conditions for this problem are 
u, +S7t,a, - 87t|X, -0^ _ ^ - Xp; =0, (16d) 
Cf/Vj 0^1 
U2 + - StCiX, ^ ^ - Xp° = 0, ( 16e) 
-ÔTt.X, ^-ÔTC^X, =0, (16f) 
I-p%-p%-B = 0. (16g) 
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From the second budget constraint B-q,P,X, = 0, we get 
-qA-q.x,^-qA^=o, (i7b) 
-q2P2-q.x,^-qA^=o. (i7c) 
Substituting (16a) and (16b) into (16f), we have 
Evaluating (17a) and (18), we have |X = X,. Further, substituting (16a), (16b), and (17b) into 
(16d), we have 
U; -Xp'-^iqi =0. (19a) 
Similarly, substituting (16a), (16b), and (17c) into (16e), we have 
Uj-X,p2-|xq2 =0. (19b) 
Since |X = X, equations (19a) and (19b) become 
U| =X(p°+qi), (19a') 
U; =X(p2+q2). (19b') 
By evaluating (19a') and (19b'), we obtain 
u,(x;,x;) k+q,)_p;  
U2(x:,x;) (p;+qj p; 
which is exactly the condition of equation (14). That is, in equilibrium of the first stage. 
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MRS between the two risky foods is independent of the level of food safety or riskiness, and 
is equated to the price of the risky good when risk is totally eradicated. This analysis 
demonstrates that the two stage maximization process could shed more insight about the 
consumer's decision problem while the results still yield the same demand functions. 
Demand for Food Safety and Willingness to Pay for Safety 
To get a meaningful interpretation of equation (13c), express the equation (13c) as 
q, = when the equilibrium Xj is non zero. Consider the maximum amount the 
A. 
consumer is willing to pay for safety P, as the following way. Let w(P, ) be the maximum 
amount that the consumer is willing to pay for safety P, per unit of Xj. Substituting 
X ;  =  - — f r o m  b u d g e t  c o n s t r a i n t  i n t o  t h e  e x p e c t e d  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  w e  h a v e  t h e  
Pa "^QzPz 
expected utility 
J = ï~(p° +qiPi )Xi + S7C (1-P,)X„(1-P,) i~(p° +qiPi)Xi 
Pz+QzPz 
Then w is implicitly defined by 
Xp 
i-(pr+w)x, 
P2+q2p2 
+ S7t (1-P,)X„(1-P,) I-(p° +w)X, -J = 0, (20) 
where J is a fbced level of expected utility. By differentiating (20) with respect to P, and 
holding Xi, X2, and p^ constant, we obtain the marginal willingness to pay for safety per unit 
ofXi 
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dw -Ô7t, (21) 
/P: p°+q,p2 
Since X = ^2^^^2^2 (13b), equation (21) becomes . Then we may 
P2+q.P2 dp, J A. 
consider D(P, ) = ^ (marginal rate of substitution of the income for safety P, per 
dPj J A, 
unit of Xj) as the conditional demand curve for P, while Xj, X2, and p; are held constant. 
averse consumer. The intersection of the safety price q, (a horizontal price line) and the 
demand curve of safety P, determines the optimal level of safety P, as shown in Figure 2. 
However, the above analysis only captures the partial effect of a change in the safety price q,. 
It should be noted that a change in q, affects the levels of Xj, X2, and p^ as well. The 
optimal levels of Xj, X2, P,, and P; should be solved simultaneously from equations (13a) to 
(13d). To get the total effect on P, by allowing Xj, X2, and P; to respond, it is necessary to 
differentiate equations (13a) to (13d) simultaneously. 
To illustrate the maximum amount the consumer is willing to pay for the optimal level 
of safety in a graph alternatively, consider the case where only Xj is risky (i.e., P^ = 1). In 
Figure 3, the quantities of Xj and X2 are measured on the horizontal and vertical axes, 
respectively. If the consumer demand for safety is zero (P, = 0 ), the budget line is 
represented by Pi'. Then the consumer chooses point C , where the indifference curve 
u(Xi ',X2 ) (not drawn) is tangent to the budget line I°I . If the impurity level in X^ is 
eliminated (P, = 1 ), the budget line is represented by I°I . In this case, the consumer chooses 
C", where u(Xi ",X2 ) (not drawn) is tangent to the budget line I°I . Given the prices P°,P2, 
Note that the demand curve is negatively sloped since 8D(P,) . 5X,7C„ 
ap, X 
< 0 for a hazard 
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q,, and q^, the horizontal difference, I -1", measures an upper limit to consumer's willingness 
to pay for safety in term of Xj. However, as shown in Proposition 2, paying this amount to 
eliminate risk is suboptimal. 
As P, changes from 0 to 1 the budget line rotates clockwise around 1°, and the 
equilibrium consumption bundle is along the price consumption curve I°0. The equilibrium 
in (14) indicates that the optimal consumption occurs along PO, somewhere between C and 
C". The optimal level of P, determines the location of the actual budget line, PI*, and 
optimal consumption occurs at C*, where PI* is tangent to U*. 
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CONCLUSION 
Conventional demand theory based on ordinal preferences is inadequate to analyze 
demand for risky goods. Consumption of an impure good not only increases utility in the 
current period, but also decreases the probability of survival into the next period. A two-
period von Neumann-Morgenstem utility function was used in this paper to derive demand 
functions for quantity and safety for two risky foods. 
When hazard content is exogenously fixed, ignoring the hazard in a risky good results 
in over-consumption of that food. Conversely, informing the consumer about the hazard in 
the food will lead to a decrease in consumption of the food. However, when both goods are 
risky, a rise in the safety level of one good generally has an ambiguous effect on the demands. 
For some products consumers may be able to choose the safety levels of consumption 
foods, such as low sodium products, fat-free products, etc. In this case, the consumer will in 
general accept some risks and perfect safety is not optimal. The joint consumption path of 
the two risky goods, X\, and X2, is determined by the ordinal preference over the two foods 
when the hazards in both risky foods are totally eliminated. Moreover, the optimal safety 
levels, P, and (Jj, are solely determined by the safety price. 
This paper has an important implication for the development of public policies on 
safety in consumer goods. Since perfect safety is not an interior solution, policies directed at 
eliminating risks are generally wasteful. This result is consistent with recommendations on 
fixing minimum acceptable contaminant levels (as with pesticide residues; Bockstael 1984). 
Currently, Uie levels of safety are not infinitely divisible and for most products consumers can 
choose among products with different levels of safety. Thus, the resolution of correctly 
modeling risk in foods will have implications for evaluation of demand and development of 
appropriate regulations. 
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NOTES 
^ An alternative approach is to assume that consumption of a risky good such as 
cigarettes increases utility by increasing pleasure but also decreases it via its adverse effect on 
health. See Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1990), Berger et al. (1987), and Falconi and Roe 
(1991). 
2 In science, risk is defined as "the probability of loss" (Kendall 1990). 
3 Alternatively, we could consider -1 ^1, where negative implies that Xj is 
a health promoting food. For example, some foods, such as milk for children, may add more 
nutrition to improve the health of children. However, this assumption would not alter the 
basic results in the paper. 
4 Let Uo denote the curve of-— passing through the point E in Figure 1. When 
h 
evaluated at (Xi*,X2*), Uq is steeper than J (— > —). When the consumer is not informed, 
J2 J2 
an equilibrium occurs at F, where - — = . Since F is to the right of E, lack of 
^2 P2 
information results in over-consumption of the risky good. 
5 In a different context, Shogren (1991) used r(x) = -2-^ as a measure of aversion, 
P (x) 
where x is an endogenous asset and p(-) is the probability function. 
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PAPER n. 
MEASURING THE WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
FOR FOOD SAFETY 
43 
INTRODUCTION 
The valuation of food safety improvement is an important issue in the study of risky 
foods. Food industries require good measures of consumers' willingness to pay (WTP) for 
reductions in the perceived risks from substances in foods to provide the information for 
production decisions. Policy makers rely on accurate measurement of the value of food 
safety to guide legislative decisions on regulating food contamination and sanitation, van 
Ravenswaay (1988) emphasized the need for economists to provide accurate valuation of 
food safety for both food industries and policy makers. 
The problem is that there exits no market for food safety. This issue is similar to that 
of measuring the WTP for environmental amenities (McConnell 1990; Loehman and Park 
1993). For valuing environmental amenities, the WTP is commonly measured as a function 
of determining variables. In the case of food safety where the hazards levels in foods can not 
be changed by the consumer, the measure of marginal WTP for safety improvement and the 
functional relationship between this WTP and the explanatory variables are of primary 
interest to researchers and policy makers. For an empirical example, see Misra et al. (1991), 
who examined the impacts of various exogenous variables on the consumer's WTP for 
pesticide-free products given a number of alternative price premia. Their study incorporates 
an individual risk perception index as well as demographic characteristics such as race sex, 
age, education, and income as the explanatory variables. One of their results is that 
respondents who are older or have a higher income have higher probability of being willing to 
pay a higher price premium than the ones who are younger or have lower income. Lin and 
Milon (1993), for another example, regressed the WTP more for safer shellfish on a set 
explanatory variables such as a risk perception index, experience of consumption, income, 
age, etc. The estimated coefficients indicated a positive effect of income and negative effect 
of age, although neither of these coefficients was statistically significant. Both studies have 
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not explained the underlying theoretical relationships in determining the change in food 
safety. 
Because the safety level is embodied in the food, another interesting aspect of food 
safety is: what is the consumer's total amount of WTP for the risky food when the safety level 
of the food is increased? This aspect has received only little attention. 
The objective of this paper is to derive measures of the consumer's marginal WTP for 
food safety in a demand model for risky foods. Also the relationships of the WTP measure 
and its explanatory variables, such as income, prices, and related safety levels, are carefully 
examined. In the absence of theoretical derivations in the marginal WTP for food safety 
measure, the properties derived from this analysis can help to evaluate the consistency of the 
estimated empirical parameters with theory. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs a demand model for the risky 
foods and states the comparative statics results. Section 3 derives the measure of the 
marginal WTP for safety and explains the properties of this measure in section 4. Section 5 
derives and briefly discusses the measure of marginal WTP for the risky food when the safety 
of that food increases. Then, the implications for empirical studies of estimating WTP for 
safety and the risky food are addressed. Finally, a summary is presented. 
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THE DEMAND MODEL WHEN SAFETY IS FIXED 
In conventional demand theory consumption goods are assumed to increase utility 
without side effects and will be called pure foods here. Foods with negative side effects will 
be called impure or "risky" foods. Consider a risky food which contains a potentially 
hazardous ingredient such as a toxin, pathogen, or carcinogen. Assume that the hazard 
cannot economically be separated by the consumer. When a commodity bundle contains an 
impure consumption food, the consumer has to weigh the direct utility gains versus potential 
health risks. Consequently, a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is used to derive 
demand functions for risky foods. 
For simplicity, assume that the consumer spends income on two risky foods each 
period. Consumer preferences in each period can be represented by a monotone increasing 
and concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 
u, = u(X„,X2,), 
where Xjt is the quantity of the risky good Xj in period t, i = 1,2. For simplicity, we consider 
a two period utility function of the consumer as 
( I )  
where ô is a discount factor, 0 < 8 ^  1. 
Equation (1) yields total utility when the survival into the second period is certain. 
Consider a representative individual who lives for two periods with time-invariant utility 
functions over the two risky foods, Xj and X2. We assume that the hazards do not affect 
consumer's utility in the current period, but affect the consumer's chance of survival in good 
"health" into the next period. Thus, the consumer faces uncertainty regarding survival into 
the next period. 
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Assume that the probability of survival is less than one and known by the consumer. 
Let It be the probability of survival into the second period, 0 ^ 7C < 1. The budget constraint 
in each period is given by 
Pl,X„+P2,X2, =I„ t = l,2. 
where Pj, and It are the price of the risky good Xj and income in period t, respectively. If the 
consumer survives, he maximizes u(X,2 .Xjj )subject to the budget constraint in the second 
period. Let X,[p,2,p22,l2] and X2[pi2,p22 J2] denote the second period demand functions. 
The indirect utility in the second period is then 
— ^[^1 (Pl2 * P22 * ^2 )* ^2 (Pl2 « P22 * ^ 2 )] 
It should be noted that the individual receives no income if he does not survive. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that the utility level in the second period is zero if the 
consumer fails to survive (U2 =0). Assume further that the utility function in each period is 
normalized so that the utility in the second period when the consumer survives is unity, i.e., 
Uj = V = 1. Then the second period utility can be written as a random variable, 
f 0, with probability (1 - i t) ,  
u, =< 
[ 1, with probability n. 
The expected utility of the consumer is 
J = u(X„X2) + 87t (2) 
where the subscript t = 1 is suppressed (i.e., X, = X,, and X2 = X;, ) and S is the time 
discount rate. 
Let Œj denote the amount of impurity per unit of the risky goods Xj consumed. For 
simplicity, the hazard content in each food is assumed to be constant and is normalized so 
that 0 ^ O] ,a2 ^ 1. Then the amounts of impurity absorbed, Cj, are defined as 
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Ci=aiXi=(l-p.)Xp i = l,2. (3) 
where P, si-a. is a measure of the safety level of Xj; an increase in Pj indicates increased 
safety of Xj. The probability of survival is written as 
7i = 7t(C,,C2). (4) 
Assume that the probability of survival is decreasing in C|, i.e., Ttj < 0, where s 
i = l,2. 
The consumer's problem is to maximize the expected utility, J = u(Xj,X2)+57t 
subject to the budget constraint, I = p,X, fp^X^. The Lagrangian function associated with 
this problem can be written as 
L = u(X„X2)+5n[(l-p,)X„(l-P2)X;]+X(I-p,X,-p2XJ. (5) 
The first order conditions are 
aL 
ax, 
8L 
axj 
= u,+8a,7t,-A.p, =0, (6a) 
= U; + - Xpz = 0, (6b) 
— = I-piX,-P2X2-0, (6c) 
where u, =-^—- The solutions to (6a), (6b), and (6c) yield the following demand functions: 
oXj 
^1 ~ ^l[Pl»P2'^»Pl»P2'^]' ^2 ~ ^ 2[Pl»P2»^'Pl'P2'^]* (7) 
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Equations in (7) imply that demand functions are conditioned on safety levels or hazards, as 
well as by prices and income. 
Hazard Aversipn and Change in Risk 
To investigate the effects of a change in hazard content, it is useful to introduce the 
notion of hazard aversion. The Arrow-Pratt measures of absolute risk aversion 
A(I) = - " and relative risk aversion R(I) = have been widely used, where u(I) 
u (I) u (I) 
is the utility of income function. To investigate consumption decisions on risky goods, we 
similarly define absolute hazard aversion in hazard Q,' 
Ai(q,Q) = ^ >0, 
TCj 
and relative hazard aversion in hazard Q, 
Ri(C„C2) = -^>0. 
Ttj 
Observe that TCjj < 0 implies that the individual who reveals hazard aversion considers that 
the initial level of toxin may not have a serious effect on survival. When the level of toxin 
continues to accumulate and exceeds some certain amount or level, the probability of survival 
drops rapidly. 
The Effect of Change in Income 
Consider the effect of a change in income on demand. Differentiating (6a) -(6c) with 
respect to I gives 
IT s • 
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where 
^^2 _ (P|^2I Pz^ii ) 
ai H 
8X, _ (J]2 ~ Jii J22 ) 
31 H 
(8b) 
(8c) 
J.= — 
'J ax,ax — "^SoCjCXjitjj, 
and H is the determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix 
[H] = 
^11 J12 Pi 
^21 ^22 "P2 
-Pi -P2 0 . 
By the second order conditions, the bordered Hessian, H = -pf J22 - P2Jn + ^ p^p^J,;, is 
ax positive. From (8a) and (8b), the sign of —is generally indeterminate. The risky good Xj 
dl 
9X 
can be said to be normal if > 0. 
dl 
Change in the Price of a Riskv Food 
As in the conventional case with riskless foods, the effect of a price change can be 
decomposed into the substitution and income effects. Differentiating the first order 
conditions (6a) - (6c) with respect to Pi yields 
ax, _ -pIX 
api H 
aX; _ pip;^ 
ap, H 
-4# 
(9a) 
(9b) 
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2) 
As in the conventional case, the first term ^ in (9a) can be viewed as the substitution 
effect, whereas the second term, income effect from a price change. In 
dX 9X general, the sign of ——^ or ——^ cannot be determined. However, note that the substitution 
dp, dp, 
e f f e c t  — i n  ( 9 a )  i s  n e g a t i v e .  I f  X j  i s  a  n o r m a l  g o o d ,  t h e n  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  p r i c e  o f  X j  
H 
will reduce the demand for Xj. 
Change in Safetv of the Riskv Food 
Consider the effect of a change in hazard content on the demand for the risky goods. 
Differentiating (6a) - (6c) with respect to P, gives 
ax, ^ -P28[P2Ui+«i7C„X,)-p,a2X,7i;,] 
ap, H 
aX; ^ PiS[p2(^i+«i^iiXi)-Pia2X,7i2i] 
ap, H 
(lOa) 
(10b) 
Note that if = 0 (defined as the situation of risk independence), then equations (10a) and 
(10b) can be written as 
ax, _ -p287Ci(l + R,) 
ap, " H 
aX; ^ P,P287t,(l + Ri) 
ap, H 
(lOa') 
(10b') 
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where Rj is the measure of relative hazard aversion in Equation (10a') implies that an 
increase in safety of Xj increases the demand for Xj for a hazard averse consumer when 
7I21 — 0. 
Change in the Discount Rate 
Differentiating the first order conditions (6a) - (6c) with respect to S and rearranging 
terms, we have 
dS 
P1P2 
1 
(X|7C| (Xt2^2 
V Pi P2 . 
H 
/ 
ax 
-P1P2 
d5 
2 _ .  
CXjTCj OC^TC '2'^2 
\ Pi P2 
H 
(lia) 
(lib) 
Define X^ to be relatively less hazardous if GCjTCj ^2^2 
Pi P2 
> 0. Therefore, an increase of 
the discount rate Ô increases the demand for Xj and decreases the demand for X2 if Xj is 
relatively less hazardous. 
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THE MEASURE OF THE MARGINAL WTP FOR SAFETY 
Based on the demand model in (2), what is the measure of marginal WTP for food 
safety improvement? Substituting (7) into (1), we have the indirect utility function 
V(p„P2.I,Pi.P2.S) 
su[x,(p,,p2,I,p,,P2,S),X2(p,,p2,I,p,,P2,S)] 
+Ô4(1-P,)X,(PPP2,I,PPP2,Ô),(1-P2)X2(P„P2,I,P„P2,Ô)]. (12) 
In order to focus on the WTP for the increment of safety in Xj, ignore pj and p; in 
(12). Further, for notational simplicity we denote the indirect utility function in (12) as 
V(I, P, p, 8), where P and p are the safety level and the price of X j, respectively. Consider an 
improvement in the safety level from P° to P' in Xj. The compensating variation p(p°,p'), 
which is the maximum amount an individual would be willing to pay to insure this change, is 
implicitly defined by 
V(I,p°,p,S) = V(I-p,P',p,S). (13) 
Differentiating both sides of (13) with respect to P' and setting ' — = 0, we have - 3V(IJ^.P,S) 
ap' 
V ,(-PP) +  V p = 0 ,  (14) 
where and the superscript in P' is omitted. Rearranging the terms in (14), we get the 
marginal WTP for safety 
Pp=-^- (15) 
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Note that Vj is the marginal utility of income X, (see Appendix A for the derivation of V,). 
For the positive V,, we observe that the marginal WTP for safety pp is positive since 
Vp = -SX,7Ci > 0 (see Appendix B for the derivation of Vp). Further, note that the marginal 
WTP for a change in safety is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between income and 
safety. More specifically, the right hand side of (15) expresses the marginal WTP for a safety 
improvement as a tradeoff between the value of safety improvement (e.g., the value of an 
increase in the probability of survival) and the value of monetary income. 
In order to get more insight about the marginal WTP for safety, consider equation 
(15) as a conditional demand for the food safety. Differentiating (15) with respect to Pand 
holding the demand for X\ and X2, and the marginal utility of income V, constant, we have 
8X^71 
P p p  =  — w h i c h  i s  n e g a t i v e  f o r  a  h a z a r d  a v e r s e  c o n s u m e r .  T h a t  i s  t h e  m a r g i n a l  W T P  f o r  
safety decreases as the safety increases by holding Xj, X2, and % constant^. The 
downward-sloping conditional demand for safety is depicted in Figure 1. In Figure 1, the 
vertical axis represents the value of the marginal WTP for safety and the horizontal axis is the 
amount of safety. When the safety increases, the marginal WTP for safety decreases along 
7C 
the curve — ' '. The purpose of this analysis is to illustrate how the conditional demand 
M 
for safety might be examined as a case analogous to the conventional downward-sloping 
demand for good. It should be noted, however, that a change in safety will affect the choices 
of Xj, X2, and V,. A formal treatment of this comparative static is examined in the next 
section. 
54 
PROPERTIES OF THE MARGINAL WTP FOR SAFETY 
Several properties of the marginal WTP measure for safety follow from (15). 
(i) The measure of marginal WTP for safety in (15) is positive by the assumption 
7C, < 0. That is the WTP for safety increases as the safety level increases. 
(ii) Studies which have valued the reduction of environmental hazards are concerned 
particularly with whether the expression of marginal WTP includes the nonobservable utility 
terms or not (Berger et al. 1987; Shogren and Crocker 1991). Only when the utility terms 
are absent from the marginal WTP, it is possible to use observed behavioral data to aggregate 
the marginal WTP across individuals, and avoid the problem of interpersonal utility 
comparisons. Berger, et al., for example, expressed the marginal WTP for an exogenous 
reduction in health risks to be dependent upon a "health risk function" alone. In our case, the 
"•ÔX It 
marginal WTP for food safety, which can be rewritten as Pp = —from (15), is 
independent of the measurement of the utility function. Therefore, the use of Pp from (15) 
can avoid the problem of interpersonal utility comparison. 
(iii) The marginal WTP for safety is downward sloping // V(I,p,p, S) is concave on 
ap). 
In general, we do not know whether the marginal WTP for safety decreases as the 
safety level increases (i.e., the sign of Ppp cannot be determined a priori). Differentiating (14) 
with respect to P, we have 
Vn(-pp) +V,p(-pp) + Vi(-ppp)+Vp,(-pp) + Vpp =0. (16) 
Rearranging terms in (16), we get 
(17) 
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Is the marginal WTP for safety, Pp, downward sloping? The marginal WTP for safety 
is downward sloping if the right hand side of (17) is negative. Since the marginal utility of 
income in the denominator of (17) is positive, ppp is negative if the numerator of (17) is 
V(l,p,p,ô) is concave on (l,P). Therefore, the marginal WTP for safety is downward 
sloping if V(I,p,p,S) is concave on (l,p). 
Alternatively, without making the assumption that V(I,p,p,ô) is concave on (I,P), 
what are the conditions which can also result in a decreasing marginal WTP for safety? 
Express Vp, and Vpp as 
where Rj is the relative hazard aversion (see Appendix C for the derivations of Vp, and Vpp). 
In order to determine the signs of Vp, and Vpp, consider the case of hazard independence 
71,2 = 0. When 71,2 = 0 and Xj is normal, Vp, is positive for a hazard averse individual in 
(18). However, the sign of Vpp in (19) can not be determined for a hazard averse individual 
negative for 71,2 = 0. Therefore, we observe that the marginal WTP for safety Pp decreases 
as the safety increases if the hazards are independent 7t,2 = 0, the marginal utility of income is 
negative. Observe that the numerator of (17), (ppVn - 2ppVp, + Vpp), is negative if 
(18) 
(19) 
even when 7C,2 =0 and Xj is normal. If ÔXfTi,, -Sjt,(l + R,) 
nonincreasing V^ ^0, and 8X^71,, -S7C,(l + Ri) < 0 for a hazard averse individual. 
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This discussion illustrates the alternative conditions which could also result in a decreasing 
marginal WTP for safety. 
(iv) If two hazards are independent fJCij = 0 ), the marginal WTP for an safety 
increment increases as income increases for an individual revealing aversion in both income 
risk and hazard (i.e., < Qand Rj < Oj. 
How does a change in income affect the marginal WTP for safety? Differentiating 
(14) with respect to I, we have 
Rearranging (20) yields 
The sign of Pp, depends on the sign of numerator in the right hand side of (21). Define 
Vn = (<)0 for an individual who reveals income risk neutrality (aversion). Further, note that 
Vp, is positive when two hazards are independent (71,2 = 0) for a hazard averse consumer 
(Rl<0) from (18). Hence, when the individual exhibits aversion in both hazard and income 
risk for two independent hazards, the marginal WTP for safety increases as income increases. 
This property clearly illustrates the sufficient conditions for the common hypothesis in 
empirical studies that there exists an increasing marginal WTP for an increase in income. 
(v) If the two hazards are independent, the marginal WTP for an improvement of 
safety in a normal food X j decreases as the price ofX j increases for an individual 
exhibiting income risk neutrality and hazard aversion. 
What is the effect of a change of price in food Xj on the marginal WTP for safety? 
Differentiating (14) with respect to p, we have 
(20) 
57 
Vip(-pp)+V,(-ppp) + Vpp =0. (22) 
Rearranging terms in (22) yields 
(23) 
The sign effect of a change in price on the marginal WTP for safety depends upon 
-Pp V,p + Vpp, the numerator of the right hand side of (23). Note that V,p = 0 for a risk 
neutral individual. Therefore the sign of Ppp depends on Vpp for a risk neutral individual. 
Further it can be shown that 
\ =-Sn,(l+R,)f^Vsa,X,it„fe\ (24) 
^ dp y \ °P y 
See Appendix C for the derivation of (24). Since < 0 for a normal good Xj, Vpp is ax, 
8p 
negative if two hazards are independent (71,2 = 0) and the individual exhibits hazard aversion 
(Rl<0). Therefore we observe that an increase in the food price decreases the marginal WTP 
for safety in that food when the individual reveals hazard aversion and income risk neutrality 
for two independent hazards. 
In a study of estimating WTP for a safety improvement in shell fish, Lin and Milon 
(1993) hypothesized that consumers are not willing to pay more for the improvement of 
safety for a relatively high priced food when compared to their WTP for a relatively low 
priced food. Their empirical results show a negative relationship between the marginal WTP 
and the price of shell fish, although the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. 
Our analytics identify the underlying assumptions implicitiy made for a decreasing marginal 
WTP with respect to the risky food price. That is, the hypothesis of Lin and Milon is 
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consistent with the assumptions that the individual reveals hazard aversion and has a constant 
marginal utility of income. 
(vi) When the individual reveals hazard aversion and income risk neutrality, an 
increase valuation on the future (i.e., an increase ofb ) increases the marginal WTP for the 
safety level in Xj if X] is relatively less hazardous than % 2  i . e . , ,  
I Pi V2 ) 
What is the effect of a change in the discount rate S on the marginal WTP for safety? 
Differentiating (14) with respect to S, we have 
%5 (~Pp ) + % (-ppg )+Vpg = 0. (25) 
Rearranging terms in (25), we get 
(26) 
Note that the sign of ppg depends on the sign of (-Pp Vjg + Vpg ), the numerator of the right 
hand side of (26). Again, if the individual exhibits income risk neutrality, then V,g = 0. 
Further, we can derive Vg, as 
dS 
(27) 
ax, See Appendix C for the derivation of (27). Note that —^ is positive if Xj is relatively less 
do 
risky than X2 (i.e., ). Therefore we can observe that Vpg is positive if two 
Pi P2 
hazards are independent (71,2 =0) and Xj is relatively less risky than X2. Hence, the 
marginal WTP for safety in Xj increases for a rise in the discount rate when the individual 
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reveals hazard aversion and income risk neutrality for a relatively less risky food Xj. The 
meaning of the positive sign in (27) is straightforward. That is, an increase in the valuation of 
future for a hazard averse individual increases the marginal WTP for the safety increment in 
Xj when Xj is relatively less hazardous than X2. In the case where there is only one risky 
food Xj (then < 0), an increase of the future valuation of life has an ambiguous effect 
Pi 
3X 
on the marginal WTP for the safety improvement in Xj since the term —^ is negative in 
00 
(27) and the sign of Vpg is ambiguous. 
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THE MEASURE OF MARGINAL WTP FOR THE RISKY FOOD 
What is the consumer's maximum willingness to pay for the risky food when the 
safety is improved? Substituting the budget constraint X; = -—into the expected 
Pa 
utility J = u(X,,X2) + ÔJi(a,X,,a2X2) in (2), the expected utility function can be expressed 
as 
J = u 
Pa J CX|X],0C2 P2 
(28) 
The maximum amount of the consumer's willingness to pay for the safer food Xj, co, is 
implicitly defined as 
P2 J (X]Xp(X2 I P2 
• J  =  0 ,  (29) 
// 
where J is a fixed amount of utility level. Totally differentiating equation (29) with respect 
to CO and P (note that we denote P as the safety level of Xj for notational simplicity), we 
have 
do) 
dp 
SXiTC) 
I —(U2+ÔCX27C2) 
P2 
(30) 
Since (u2 = ^P2 from the first order condition, equation (30) can be written as 
dco 
dp 
8Xi7II 
X 
(31) 
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Note that the sign of ^ 
dp 
in (31) is positive. Equation (31) says the total amount that the 
consumer is willing to pay for the risky food increases as the safety level increases. 
Note that since A, = V,, the right hand side of (31) is exactly the same as the marginal 
WTP for safety in (15). The comparative statics results follow the discussion of properties 
(iii) to (vi) in the section of properties of the marginal WTP for safety. 
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IMPLICATION FOR EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
In this section we focus on the discussion of empirical studies in estimating the 
marginal WTP for food safety. Empirical methods used to elicit the WTP measures for safety 
improvement include a wide range of approaches, such as the contingent valuation method 
(Misra et al. 1991; Lin and Milon 1991), laboratory experimental approach (Shin et al. 1992; 
Fox et al. 1993), and market-based studies (van Ravenswaay and Hoehn 1991). Can these 
expressed WTP measures be directly applied in food policy analysis? Despite the valuation 
methods being used, researchers, particularly those who use contingent valuation methods, 
usually collect data on the WTP measures as well as respondent's income and demographic 
characteristics. Then, they seek to explain how the magnitude in the WTP measures varies 
among different explanatory variables. The examination of the functional relationship 
between the marginal WTP measures and the independent variables in the previous section 
can provide useful tests for verifying the validity of applying the estimated WTP in policy 
analysis. 
Note that the marginal WTP for food safety, which is implicitly defined by equation 
(15), is a function of prices, income, change in safety levels, and the future discount rate. In 
the case of many risky foods, the marginal WTP for the food safety improvement can be 
expressed as a function of the form f(p,I, Ap,ô), where pis a vector of prices, I is the 
income, A|3 is a vector of change in safety, and S is the time discount rate. For empirical 
studies, the measure of marginal WTP may be specified as the following 
Marginal WTP= f (p, I, Ap, S; D)+e, 
where D is a vector of demographic characteristics and e is the disturbance term. The 
properties of the marginal WTP, as discussed in the previous section, may be evaluated by 
decomposing the marginal WTP into several components for each explanatory variable. 
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Without decomposition, the hypothesized signs of coefficients are often undetermined. In the 
following we review the recent empirical studies in examining the relationship between the 
marginal WTP for safety improvement and the explanatory variables of prices and income, 
and relate these empirical results with the properties of the marginal WTP for safety 
discussed in the previous section. Then we focus on the issue of measuring the variable of 
safety or change in safety in empirical applications. 
Surveys designed to elicit individuals' WTP for safety improvement usually do not 
have data on food prices. Hence, when researchers use cross section survey data, the food 
prices are assumed to be the same across respondents and are commonly omitted in the 
regression analysis of WTP. Evidence shows that the individual's consumption decision is 
often based on the multiattribute context of food related decisions (Halbrendt et al. 1993; Lin 
and Milon 1993). That is, the decision for the consumer to respond to a change in WTP for 
the safety improvement is likely to depend upon not only the change in safety but also the 
resulting change in prices of foods and other attributes. Therefore, incorporating the change 
in prices into consumers' decision of WTP will lead us to greater insight about the variation in 
consumers' responses to changes in the marginal WTP for safety. 
Recall that equation (21) implies that when income increases, an increasing marginal 
WTP for safety exists for a hazard averse consumer with the nonincreasing marginal utility of 
income. Empirical studies, such as Buzby et al. (1993), Lin and Milon (1993), Misra et al. 
(1991), and Underbill and Figueroa (1993), all showed a positive relationship between 
income and the consumer's value of safer food. This evidence is consistent with property (iv) 
in section of properties of the marginal WTP for safety. That is, the marginal WTP for safety 
will increase as income increases when the individual reveals hazard aversion as well as 
income risk aversion (or income risk neutrality). 
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The measure of the safety index P or change in safety level is the most troublesome 
variable in empirical studies. A distinction of whether the safety index is directly observed or 
not is a caution here. The ideal measure of the safety index perceived by the consumers 
should be objectively measured in technological improvement of the safety of food. 
However, even where such measures exist, scientific information may not be fully understood 
by the consumers. While news reports are a major source of information to consumers, 
Maney and Plutzer (1993) found evidence that journalists might report the effects of using 
irradiation in cleaning livestock with their own political ideology. Therefore, the scientific 
measures of safety perceived by the consumers are not directly observable. 
In practice, methods used to elicit WTP for safer food usually provide respondents 
with information on mortality or morbidity risk reduction. Then the interviewers may ask the 
question "how much do you want to pay for this risk reduction?" Since the human ability to 
correctly perceive information is complex and sensitive to the way information is presented, it 
is important to note that the results of such surveys or experiments may be sensitive to the 
type and manner in which information is provided. Studies on how to design appropriate 
surveys have been reviewed in the areas of evaluating risk reduction in life (such as Jones-Lee 
et al. 1985) and valuation of the environmental amenities (see Choices, second quarter 1993 
for a review). As mentioned by Belzer and Therous (1993), these criteria for appropriately 
eliciting the value of WTP for environmental amenities should be carried on to the 
methodology in valuing safer food. 
One point related to the functional specification of WTP should be mentioned here. 
Among empirical estimations of WTP for valuing food safety on the basis of surveys, the 
change in safety level is usually omitted in the specification equation since all respondents are 
given the same information about the risk reduction. Evidence has shown that consumers 
form their own perceptions about the safety improvement information given by the 
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interviewers, despite how the safety information is given. That is, the consumers value WTP 
based on their own perception of the risk reduction provided by the interviewers. The 
consumer's attitude toward the risk information is the direct factor that affects the measure of 
WTP. In this sense, the level of safety perceived by the consumers is not directly observed. 
Latent variables models are commonly used to find the approximation index for the 
unobservable explanatory variables in studies which examine the impact of consumers' 
attitudes or awareness on demand for goods (Train et al. 1987; Jensen et al. 1992). We may 
consider using the methodology in the latent variables model as one of the approaches to 
recover the unobserved variable of the consumers' attitudes in food safety studies. 
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SUMMARY 
This paper derives theoretical measures of the marginal WTP for safety. The 
marginal WTP measure for safety is independent of the utility function. All the properties of 
marginal WTP for safety are addressed. These properties illustrate how the marginal WTP 
for safety is affected by a change in explanatory variables such as the safety level, income, 
and prices. All of the results of comparative statics results regarding to the marginal WTP 
for safety are summarized in Table 1. Table 1 clearly indicates the sufficient conditions which 
result in determining the signs of the impacts of exogenous variables on the marginal WTP 
for safety. For example, if two hazards are independent (tTij = 0 ) and the marginal utility of 
income is constant, then an increase in the price of food decreases the marginal WTP for 
safety. The discussion of these properties could shed more insight for understanding the 
signs of estimated coefficients in empirical studies. For instance, the common hypothesis that 
marginal WTP for safety increases when income increases should be contingent on the 
assumptions that the consumers reveal hazard aversion and income risk aversion (or income 
risk neutrality). 
Further, we review some of the studies in empirical specification of WTP for food 
safety. The food prices were commonly omitted in the marginal WTP equation and most of 
empirical results suggested a positive relation between income and the marginal WTP. 
Finally, we pointed out the problems of measuring the variable of safety level and suggested 
that one way to recover the unobserved variables is to apply the latent variables models. 
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NOTES 
p" (x) 
^ In a different context, Shogren (1991) used r(x) = —^ as a measure of aversion, 
P (x) 
where x is an endogenous asset and p( ) is the probability function. 
2 An alternative way to explain equation (15) is to examine how the risk premium 
changes as the hazard increases. The risk premium here is defined as the amount of money 
that the consumer is willing to give up in order to insure the certainty. Let us consider the 
case of one risky food (i.e., P2 = 1) and the price of X2 is normalized as one. Therefore, the 
risk premium, r\, is implicitly defined as 
u(X„ I - p,X, - Ti)+Ô • 1 = u(X,, I - p,X, ) + S4(l - P, )X J 
Taking a Taylor's series expansion around (X,,I - p,X, ) for both sides of the above equation, 
we have the left hand side 
u(X,.I-p,X,-ri)+8-lsu(X„I-p,X,)+8+(X,-X,)u,(X„I-p,X,) 
+[(I - p,X, ) - T1 - (I - p,X, )]u, (X„ I - p,X, )+O' (•), 
and the right hand side 
u(X„I-p,X,)+S7t[(l-p,)X,] = u(XpI-p,X,) + S7c[(l-P,)X,]+0^(-) 
where 0^( ) and 0^( ) are the second and third orders of the remainders. Equating both 
sides of the expansion and setting the remainders equal to zero, we have the risk premium 
' U, • 
Note that since the budget constraint is linear in X2 and the price of X2 is normalized at one 
the risk premium can be expressed as Ti = where A, is the marginal utility of income. 
A 
The meaning of this risk premium is straightforward. The amount of money that the 
individual is willing to give up to insure the certainty of survival is equal to the discounted 
value of non survival weighted by the marginal utility of income. How much is the individual 
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willing to give up for an additional unit of increased risk? Differentiating the risk premium 
with respect to a,, we have 
dr\ -5X,7Ci 
3a, X 
Note that since X = V,, the right hand side of the above equation has the same expression as 
that appears in equation (15). 
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Table 1. The comparative statics for the marginal WTP for safety^ 
sign 
0
 I
I 
V(l,p,p,8) 
is concave 
on (1,(5) 
7II2 — 0, 
and 
V „ < 0  
7ti2 = 0 ,  
and 
V n = 0  
71,2 =0, 
v„=o,  
and 
Pi P2 
Ppp ? - nr nr nr 
Ppi ? nr2 + nr nr 
Ppp ? nr nr - nr 
Pps ? nr nr nr + 
1 Assume Xj and X2 are normal, and the consumer reveals hazard aversion (Rj > 0). 
2 "nr" indicates that the sign is irrelevant to the assumption made in that column. 
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Figure 1. The Conditional Demand for Food Safety P 
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APPENDIX 
A. Derivation of V,; 
Differentiating (12) with respect to I yields 
31 
l+ôa^Ttîl ^ 
= (u,+Sa,7C,)|^^j+(u2+Sa27i2)|^^j. (Al) 
Since u, +5a,7C, = A,p, and U; fSagTt; = kp^ from the first order conditions, we have 
V, = X  
di 
(A2) 
Further, since p, +P2 = 1 from the budget constraint, we have V, = X, the 
marginal utility of income. 
B. Derivation of V„: 
Differentiating (12) with respect to p, we have 
Rearranging terms in (Bl) yields 
3X3 
ap -SXiTC,. (Bl) 
rax.l / . % =("1+8a,7c,) -^j+(u2+802712) 
v 9 P /  
-8X,7C,. (B2) 
74 
Again, since u, +Sai7C, = Xp, and Uj fSagn:; = Xpg from the first order conditions, equation 
(B2) becomes 
V » = X  faX; 
ap -SX,7Ii. (B3) 
Since p, ^ax, 
ap + P2 
fax 
UP 
2 -
= 0 from equations (9a) and (9b), we have 
Vp =-8X]7t]. (B4) 
C. Derivations of Vp,, Vpp,VB„,and Vgg: 
Derivation of V, pi-
Since Vp = -ÔX,?!, in (B4), we have 
(CI) 
Substituting the relative hazard aversion R, = into (CI), we have Vp, as 
'pi = -Stc, (l + R, - 5a2X,7i,2 ^ax/ ai (C2) 
Derivation of V», 
Again, differentiating (B4) with respect to p, we have 
VflB = -SJti 
ax, 
t a p  
-ôa,X,7c„ 'ax, 
t a p ,  
-8a2X,n 12 
aX; 
ap -j + SXf7C„. (C3) 
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Substituting R, - ' ' " into (C3) and rearranging terms yields 
7l| 
Vg3=ÔXf7l„-Ô7I,(l + R,) 
ap. ^2^1^12 
aX; 
l a p  
Derivation of V, PP-
Differentiating (B4) with respect to p, we have 
ax / "W \ Vbp=-5jCi -ôa,X,7t„ -T-^ -ôaaXiîc 
a? 
ax 
V ^ / 
•'12 
axz 
dp 
Substituting R, into (C5), we get V 
Tt] ' PP as 
Vpp =-ÔJCi(l + Ri) -^^j-SajXiTCj^ m 
Derivation of Vnc: 
Differentiating (B4) with respect to S, we have 
(C4) 
(C5) 
(C6) 
Substituting R, = —*—^ into (C7) and rearranging terms, we have 
re, 
^P5 =-X,7C, - gjc, j " ^ 2^1 ^12 j' (C8) 
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PAPER m. 
EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATION OF RISKY FOODS 
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INTRODUCTION 
Food safety cases and increased scientific evidence on food related diseases have 
resulted in increasing attention by media, consumers, and policy makers to food consumption 
choices and posed new demands for public involvement. This attention has been reflected in 
the concerns of Congress. In 1989,16 food safety bills were introduced into Congress. 
These legislative proposals addressed a variety of considerations related to regulating food 
safety problems, such as banning particular pesticides, offering financial incentives to use 
substitute chemicals in production, and regulating food labeling to improve consumers' 
information (Kramer 1990). During the period of 1990 to 1992, several legislative proposals 
concerning food safety were continuously introduced to Congress (Food Review). Most of 
them focused on the establishment of a standard level on food sanitation during processing or 
delivery. And currently there is public debate about the appropriate organization of food 
safety regulation within the federal government. 
So far, only a few economic studies have focused on the welfare implications of the 
food safety policies. For examples, Morales and Thurman (1993) evaluated the resulting 
benefits and costs caused by a regulation policy to control sahnonella enteritis on shell and 
breaker markets. Huang (1993) developed a framework to examine the ex ante welfare costs 
for producers and consumers in response to a pesticide reduction regulation. Among these 
studies, an underline presumption is that the initial levels of safety and quantity are optimal. 
Hence the analysis is taken to compare the initial levels and the resulting equilibria changes 
brought about by a policy change. The difference between the initial welfare and the 
resulting welfare by regulation is referred to the welfare losses. 
An interesting question arises from these studies in regulating food safety. If the 
initial equilibria in markets are optimal, then any policy which distorts the market will result in 
a welfare loss. Therefore, we return to a natural question of whether or not it is necessary 
78 
for the government to intervene in markets when the food safety level is of concern. If the 
market fails to provide the optimal safety level, what are the implications for the government 
to choose efficient policies to improve social welfare. When the market fails to provide the 
desirable safety level, the government in general may take the following ways to reduce the 
welfare losses (Choi and Jensen 1991). First, the government may require producers to 
disseminate the necessary information about the risk characteristics into the product label or 
it may provide necessary information directly to the consumers. Second, it can use a tax 
(subsidy) to restrict the outputs or inputs in order to reduce hazards to the public. Third, it 
may set the level of food safety or maximum tolerance levels for risky inputs used in 
producing foods directly to avoid the possible consumers' losses. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the equilibrium levels of quantity 
and safety in the perfectly competitive markets are socially optimal levels. Is there a need for 
the government to intervene in perfectly competitive markets? We examine this question in 
the following way. First, we define and establish the conditions for determining the socially 
optimal quantities and safety levels. Then we compare these conditions with the equilibrium 
conditions under perfectly competitive markets. The observation is that the perfectly 
competitive markets would provide the socially desirable safety levels when the safety 
information is fully perceived by the consumer. However, when the consumer forms 
subjective beliefs about the safety level or there exists uncertainty about the impact of hazard 
on survival, will the competition in markets still lead to socially optimal levels of safety? 
Although this question has not been further analyzed, we suggest that it is unlikely that 
competitive markets would yield socially desirable levels of safety and quantity when safety is 
perceived with uncertainty. 
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the demand model for risky foods 
and the production structure of firms under the perfectly competitive markets. Section 3 
defines the socially optimal conditions. Section 4 derives the perfectly competitive market 
conditions and compares these conditions with the socially optimal conditions. Finally, the 
implications for food safety regulations are addressed. 
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THE PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS FOR RISKY FOODS 
Consider the situation where there are two safety levels of a risky food available in the 
markets. Assume a representative consumer allocates his income on a numeraire good Z and 
the risky food X, where there are two safety levels of food X available for the consumer in 
the market. Examples are cases where there are foods with regular fat and low fat, naturally 
occurring level of cholesterol and cholesterol free, etc. Denote food Xj with the safety level 
P, and X2 with the safety level Pj. The consumer is assumed to choose a combination of Xj 
and X2, and the numeraire good Z. 
In the case where a commodity bundle contains an impure consumption food, the 
consumer has to weigh the direct utility gains versus potential health risks. Assume Xj and 
X2 are perfect substitutes in the sense their sum enters the utility function u( ) directly. That 
is the consumer's current utility u( ) depends on Z and the sum of Xj and X2. For simplicity, 
let us consider a two period utility of the consumer as 
"=SL,''W,+x,„z,), (I) 
Equation (1) yields total utility when the survival into the second period is certain. We 
assume that the hazards do not affect consumer's utility in the current period, but affect the 
consumer's chance of survival in good "health" into the next period. Thus, the consumer 
faces uncertainty regarding survival into the next period. 
Assume that the probability of survival is less than one and known by the consumer. 
Let 7t be the probability of survival into the second period, 0 < 7i< 1. It should be noted that 
the individual receives no income if he does not survive. Without loss of generality, we 
assume that the utility level in the second period is zero if the consumer fails to survive 
(uj = 0). Assume further that the utility function in each period is normalized so that the 
utility in the second period when the consumer survives is unity, i.e., Uj = Vj = 1 where Vj is 
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the indirect utility function in the second period. Then the second period utility can be 
written as a random variable, 
r 0, with probability (1 - it), 
^ [1, with probability it. 
The expected utility of the consumer is 
J = u(X,+X2,Z)+Sjt, (2) 
where the subscript t = 1 is suppressed (i.e., X, = X„ and Xg = X^, ). 
Let Œj denote the amount of impurity per unit of the risky goods X\ consumed. For 
simplicity, the hazard content in each food is assumed to be constant and is normalized so 
that 0 :< ^ 1. Further, the total hazards which enter the probability of survival function 
are assumed to be the sum of two impurities, i.e., the total hazards are (l - P, )X, + (l - P; )X2 
where a, = 1 - p,. Then the probability of survival is written as 
7C = 7t[(l-P,)X,+(l-P2)X,]. (3) 
Assume that the probability of survival is decreasing in (1 - P, )X, + (1 - Pj )X2, i.e., tc' < 0. 
Therefore, the consumer's expected utility is 
u[X, + Xj, Z]+Sji[(1 - P, )X, + (1 - P2 )Xj. (4) 
Note that this model is related to the repackaging model of quality varying goods 
(Deaton and Muellbauer 1980) but they are not exactly the same. In considering the quality 
difference of a representative good, the utility function of a simple repackaging model for a 
good with two quality levels of concern could be considered as u = u[P;X| fP^X^.Z], where 
pj now is referred to the quality parameter of good X^. However, in our study, the expected 
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utilit)' function can be implicitly expressed as J s j[x, +X2,(l -Pi)X, +(l -P2)X2,Z], where 
the hazards has an adverse effect on J. 
Further, we assume the price of Xj taking a linear price schedule, Pi(Pi) = p° +qjPj, 
where p° is the "pure" quantity price and qj is the price of safety for food Xj. This 
assumption is analogous to the price-quality trade-offs function suggested by Houthakker 
(1951-52). Houthakker considered a price-taking consumer faces a linear price function: 
Pj = a; + bjPi, where aj is the "pure quantity" price, bj is the "quality" price, and P, is the 
quality level associated with good i; bj could be referred to as the cost per unit of quality 
associated with one unit of the good i (Hanemann 1982). 
In the production side, assume Xj and X2 are produced by different firms. For 
simplicity, assume all competitive firms in market 1 for producing Xj are identical. Also, all 
competitive firms in market 2 for producing X2 are identical. Consider a representative Arm 
in each market producing a risky product. The representative firm's profits in each market 
are defined, respectively, as 
Ml =(p!'+qA)x,-C,(X|,P|),and (5a) 
M2=(p;+q2P:)X;-Q(X„P,), (5b) 
where Ci(0 is the cost function for the representative firm in market i. Assume that Mj is 
concave on Xj and P,, respectively, for i = 1,2. 
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THE SOCIALLY OPTIMAL CONDITIONS 
The individual income is assumed to be allocated among X), X2, and Z. Therefore, 
the price-taking individual's budget constraint is 
i=(pr+qA)x,+(p;+q2P2)x,+z,  (6)  
where the price of Z is normalized as one. The socially optimal levels of quantity and safety 
are obtained by solving the maximization problem of a representative consumer who receives 
the profits from both productions. That is the representative consumer also receives the 
income from producers and the consumer's budget constraint becomes 
I + Mi+Mj =(p° +qiPi)x,+(p2+q2P2)^2 + Z. (7) 
Rearranging (7), this constraint could be expressed in term of Z 
Z=I-C,(X„p,)-C;(X„|3j. (8) 
Then the socially optimal levels of quantities and safety levels are defined as the situation 
where the consumer chooses X^, X2, P, ,and P2 to maximize the expected utility 
u[x,+x„l-c,(x„p,)-c;(x„pj]+8lt[(l-p,)x.+(l-p,)x,]. (9) 
Denote X = X, + Xj and C s (1 - Pj )X| + (1 - Pj )X2. The first order conditions for this 
problem are 
Ux + 8(1 - Pi )7ic _ 9C| (10a) 
u z ax,' 
Ux +8(1 P2)7Cc _ 9C2 (10b) 
Uz d X ,  '  
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-SX,7Uc _ac. 
"z ap, ' 
-ôXjîtc aq 
Uz ap,' 
(10c) 
(lOd) 
where u* s—, s—, and =-^. The solutions to (10a) - (lOd) yield the socially 
^ Bx ^ az ^ ac 
optimal levels for X j, X2, Pj, and pj • In this case, the representative consumer who is also 
the producer would choose the levels of Xj and P, by equating the marginal benefits of the 
consumer to the marginal costs of the production for both Xj and Pj in each market, 
respectively. 
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THE EQUILIBRIA UNDER THE PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS 
Assume the infomiation about the safety levels P, ,and P2 are correctly recognized by 
the consumer in the perfectly competitive markets. Therefore, the representative consumer's 
problem is to choose Xj, X2, and Z to maximize the expected utility, 
u[x,+x„z]+8it[(i-p,)x,+(i-pjxj, (11) 
subject to the budget constraint, 
I =(pr +q,P.)x, +(p; +q,PJX, +Z. (12) 
Substituting Z in (12) into (11), the representative consumer's problem is rewritten as to 
choose Xj and X2 to maximize the expected utility function: 
Jsu[x,+X2,I-(p° +q,P,)x, -(p2+q2P2)X2]+ 
8lt[(l-P,)X,+(l-PJX,]. (13) 
The first order conditions for this problem are 
In this case, the consumer under perfectly competitive markets chooses the equilibrium 
quantities of Xj and X2 by equating the marginal benefit of X{ to the price of Xj for i = 1,2. 
What is the consumer's marginal willingness to pay for the safety Pj per unit of Xj 
(i.e., what is the expression for the value of qj)? It can be shown that the consumer's 
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marginal willingness to pay for the safety Pj (i.e., qj) is —for i = 1,2. ^  These results can 
My 
be expressed as 
_ -SXiTic q,X,=-^^^, (14c) 
q,X, = . (14d) 
The representative firm's problem in the perfectly competitive market i is assumed to 
be choosing Xj and P, to maximize the profit at given prices. Therefore, the first order 
conditions for (5a) and (5b) are 
(pr+qiPi) = ^ . (15a) 
(p;+qA)=||^. (13b) 
fir* 
qiX,=-^, (15c) 
OPl 
fir* (15d) 
0P2 
In this case, the representative firm in market Xj chooses the levels of Xj and Pj by equating 
the prices of Xj and Pj to the marginal cost of Xj and Pj, respectively, for i=l,2. 
By examining the equations (14a)-(14d) and (15a)-(15d), we observe that the 
perfectly competitive equilibria of quantity and safety are obtained by equating the 
consumer's marginal benefits to the marginal costs in the production. This is because the 
consumer equates the marginal benefits to the prices and the producer equates the prices to 
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the marginal costs. Combining the consumer's optimal condition of equations (14) and the 
producers' optimal condition of equations (15) yields the exact same conditions as equations 
(lOa)-(lOd), which provide the socially optimal levels of quantity and safety. That is, under 
perfectly competitive markets for both X] and X2, the equilibria of quantity and safety are 
socially desirable. 
The above analysis is under the assumption that the product information is accurately 
perceived by the consumers. If this is the case, this result implies there is no need for the 
government to regulate the food safety level when the market is perfectly competitive for 
each safety level. The role for the government in this case may be restricted only to require 
the producers to provide accurate information to consumers. However, if accurate 
information is not fully prevailing in the market, then the underling market may fail to provide 
the optimal levels of quantity and safety. Further, even if the product information is 
accurately transmitted, the consumer may have a subjective belief or distribution about the 
hazards in the risky foods that differs from the covered information (National Academy of 
Sciences 1989). Will the perfectly competitive markets still yield the socially desirable levels 
of safety and quantity when the consumer formulates a subjective belief about the hazards? If 
the market fails to provide desirable safety, what are the implications for the role of 
government in choosing public policies to improve the social welfare? We discuss these 
implications for food policies in the next section. 
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CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
A demand for risky food model allows examining the question of whether the 
competition outcomes lead to socially optimal levels. It is shown that if accurate information 
about the hazard content is provided, the desired levels of safety and quantity by the policy 
makers are the same choices that result from consumers and producers acting in competitive 
markets. This result implies that there is no need for the government to intervene when 
competitive markets prevail and information on the safety content of food is fully provided. 
In this case, the consumer can optimally choose the product differentiated by the safety 
content. Examples include choices between cholesterol free and natural cholesterol products, 
sugar free and regular sugar products, irradiated meat or not, meat with low fat or high fat, 
organic fruit or not, etc. Further, we may distinguish markets which have products of 
different qualities. In these markets, the role of government may be limited to the verification 
of label information being accurately provided. 
However, the assumption that the consumer perceives perfectly the hazard content 
does not hold for many risky food markets. It is quite possible that asymmetric information 
about the hazard content prevails in risky food markets because producers have no incentive 
to provide accurate information if the provision of information is costly or the adverse 
information may affect the product sales (Choi and Jensen 1991; Falconi and Roe 1991). 
Furthermore, even if the information is perfectly provided, the consumer may form his or her 
subjective perception about the potential hazard effects on health which differs from actual 
levels and this difference may result in undesirable social levels of safety and quantity. 
Examples include the case where the consumer's belief about safety differs from 
objective/scientific evidence on the safety of products grown with pesticide use, grown with 
artificial hormone use, or treated with irradiation. In these cases, the resulting markets with 
random safety levels perceived by consumers are not likely to provide the socially desirable 
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levels of safety and quantity. A single policy instrument, for example setting a higher safety 
standard only for one food, will not guarantee the improvement of social welfare level in the 
many risky foods markets. In considering all of the possible instruments like government's 
signaling the safety information or requiring the producers to provide necessary information, 
taxing the hazard inputs (or subsiding the safety improvement), and regulating the minimum 
standard safety levels, the government could choose the combination of these instruments by 
comparing the expected marginal gain of each policy to its respective marginal cost 
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NOTES 
' In this case, we derive the consumer's marginal willingness to pay for safety per unit 
of Xj as the following way. Let us consider the case of safety improvement of Xj first. The 
maximum amount the consumer is willing to pay for safety Pi, w,, per unit of Xj is implicitly 
defined as 
»[x,+X„I-prX,-w,X,-(p;+q3PjX,]+8lt[(l-P,)X,+(l-P,)Xj]-J=0, (13') 
where is a fixed level of expected utility. Assume w, (P, ) is the WTP for safety per unit of 
Xj satisfying (13'). Totally differentiating (13') with respect to w, and P, gives 
^ = (13») 
dPj Ug 
That is the consumer's marginal WTP for safety P, per unit of Xj is —Therefore, the 
Uz 
value of q, is Multiplying both sides of q, and by Xj, this relation can be 
""Sx 7C 
expressed as q^X, = Following the same argument above for the valuation of 
U7 
safety Pg, we can derive the following relation: q^X^ = -SX^Tic 
"z 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
A demand for risky food model is constructed to study several aspects of food safety. 
On the basis of a proposed demand model, several results are addressed in the following. 
First, when the food safety is exogenously fixed, an increase in the safety level of the risky 
food Xj increases the demand for Xj if Xj is normal. However, when both goods are risky, 
a rise in the safety level of one good generally has an ambiguous effect on the demands. For 
the case where the safety level is endogenously chosen, the consumer will in general accept 
some risks and perfect safety is not optimal. 
Second, in the absence of a market place for the food safety, a measure of the 
marginal willingness to pay for the safety improvement is derived. The expression of the 
marginal willingness to pay for safety is independent of the utility function. The use of this 
marginal willingness to pay measure can avoid the interpersonal utility comparison in the 
empirical studies. Although the signs of the comparative static analysis of the marginal WTP 
for safety are ambiguous, the conditions which result in a deterministic sign in a comparative 
static study are clearly shown and discussed. The discussion of these conditions could shed 
more insight for understanding the signs of estimated coefficients in empirical studies. For 
instance, the common hypothesis of the increasing marginal willingness to pay for safety with 
respect to income should be contingent on the assumptions that consumers reveal hazard 
aversion and income risk aversion (or income risk neutrality). In the recognition that food 
safety is embodied in the food, we also derive the measure of the marginal willingness to pay 
for the risky food with respect to an increase in safety. 
Third, given full information about the safety content, competitive markets would 
yield the optimal levels of quality and quantity. This result implies that there is no need for 
the government to intervene when competitive markets prevail and information on the safety 
content of food is fully provided. However, when the safety information is perceived with 
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uncertainty, the competitive market would not likely produce the socially desirable levels of 
either safety or quantity. 
This study points out three important food safety issues that have not been received 
considerable attention. They are (1) the study of multi-risky foods case, (2) the theoretical 
treatment in determining the sign impacts of exogenous variables on the marginal willingness 
to pay for safety and the marginal willingness to pay for the risky food, and (3) the 
equilibrium analysis by the influence of food safety information. These three papers on food 
safety issues could help the future development of either theoretical or empirical studies in 
the demand for risky foods. 
Future researches could include two aspects. First, consider to extend the demand for 
risky food model into more periods where we can examine the role of future income in 
determining the demand for risky foods. Under the multiperiod model we can incorporate 
the government signal in information and examine how the signal affects the demand for the 
risky foods in the long run. Then, we can examine the role of hazard aversion in such a 
multiperiod demand model. Second, consider the possibility of self-protecting behavior in 
reducing the risky content and hence the probability of survival function. 
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